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IPSE DIXIT: THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
AND THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT LAW
Gregory E. Maggs*
I. Introduction
Contracts casebooks often use a three-step approach in teaching legal
doctrines like consideration, offer and acceptance, or the statute of frauds.
They first reprint a decision that applies the traditional rule that most courts
followed until the middle of this century. Then, for contrast, they include
another case that rejects the traditional approach in favor of a new and
usually more flexible standard. Finally, the casebooks quote a provision
from the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Contracts1
(the “Restatement (Second)”) that adopts the more modern view.
Professors E. Allan Farnsworth and William F. Young’s Cases and
Materials on Contracts,2 one of the most popular contracts casebooks,
contains several examples of this pattern. For instance, in covering the topic
of modification, the authors first reprint Arzani v. People.3 In that case, a
subcontractor named Arzani agreed to pave a road for a general contractor
for a fixed price.4 When a labor dispute arose, Arzani told the general
contractor he would need more money to complete the work.5 Although the

*

Associate P rofesso r of Law, Georg e W ashington U niversity Law Sc hoo l. I
would like to thank Dean Jack Friedenthal and the Law School for their generous
financial support. Professors Peter B. Maggs, Mark M ovsesian, Richard J. Pierce,
and Jonathan S iegel gave me helpful comm ents. John Nargiso, J.D. 1999, provided
invaluable research assistance. I also benefited from an unpublished paper by a
former stu de nt, Ulrik e Patzl, LL.M . 1997, on promissory estop pel and the statute
of frauds.
1
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). T he title page of this work
identifies it as the “Restatement of the Law of Contracts Second.” Id. at 1. B y
convention and Bluebook form, however, most writers call it the “Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.” See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 84-85
(16th ed. 1 996 ).
2
E. Allan Farnsworth & William F. Young, Cases and M aterials on Contracts
(5th ed . 199 5).
3
149 N.Y .S.2d 38 (N .Y. Sup. Ct. 1956), reprinted in Farnsworth & Young,
supra note 2, at 355-56.
4
See id. at 39-40.
5
See id . at 40.
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general contractor promised to pay Arzani an additional sum, the court held
this promise unenforceable.6 The court explained that the general
contractor had received nothing in exchange for his promise to pay more
money because Arzani had a preexisting duty to complete the work and that
the contractor’s promise therefore lacked consideration. 7
*509 Immediately following the Arzani case, Farnsworth and Young
reprint a contrary decision called Watkins & Son v. Carrig.8 In that case,
an excavator agreed to dig a cellar for a man named Carrig.9 The excavator
encountered unexpected bedrock and declared that it would need more
money to complete the work.10 Carrig promised to pay the additional
amount requested, and the court held the promise enforceable.11 Refusing
to apply the traditional preexisting duty rule relied on in Arzani, the court
concluded that fairness required enforcement of the promise in view of the
unforeseen difficulty of the work. 12
In notes printed in connection with Arzani and Watkins, the authors cite
section 89(a) of the Restatement (Second).13 Section 89(a) adopts the
holding of Watkins, stating: “A promise modifying a duty under a contract
not fully performed on either side is binding. . . if the modification is fair
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when
the contract was made.”14 The Reporter’s Note following section 89
describes the section as “new” and cites Watkins as authority.15 Several
other leading casebooks cover the topic of modification using this same
three-step approach.16
Another example from the Farnsworth and Young casebook concerns
the ability of past services to serve as consideration. The authors first

6

See id.
See id .
8
21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941), reprinted in Farnsworth & Young, supra note 2, at
357-61.
9
See id . at 591 .
10
See id.
11
See id . at 591 , 594 .
12
See id. at 594.
13
See F arnsworth & Yo ung, sup ra note 2, at 353, 3 56.
14
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981 ).
15
Id. § 8 9 rep orter’s note.
16
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law
130-34 (6th ed. 1996); Arthur Rosett, Contract Law and Its Application 240 -65 (5 th
ed. 1994).
7
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reprint Mills v. Wyman.17 In that famous old case, a sailor fell ill and a
man named Mills cared for him.18 Mills later notified the sailor’s father,
Wyman, who promised to pay Mills for the services that he had rendered.19
The court, however, refused to enforce Wyman’s promise. 20 It explained
that although the father may have had a moral duty to pay for the services,
the father had received nothing in exchange for the promise because Mills
already had performed.21 This case illustrates the traditional rule that
“past” or “moral” consideration generally cannot serve as a basis for
enforcing promises. 22
Following Mills v. Wyman, Farnsworth and Young include Webb v.
McGowin. 23 In that more recent case, Webb saved McGowin’s life by
diverting *510 a falling piece of wood.24 To show his gratitude for this
service and to compensate Webb for injuries that he had sustained,
McGowin promised to pay Webb a small pension for the rest of his life.25
The court enforced the promise even though Webb had not exchanged any
new consideration.26 The court concluded that Webb’s past action sufficed
in the circumstances. 27
In a note following these two cases, Farnsworth and Young cite section
86 of the Restatement (Second), 28 which adopts the holding of Webb v.
McGowin. Section 86 states: “A promise made in recognition of a benefit
previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the
extent necessary to prevent injustice.”29 The Reporter’s Note to section 86
describes the section as “new” and cites Webb v. McGowin (among other

17

20 M ass. (3 P ick.) 207 (1825), reprinted in Farnsworth & Y oung , supra note
2, at 67 .
18
See id. at 207.
19
See id .
20
See id . at 212 .
21
See id . at 211 .
22
See id. The court noted that the law traditionally had recognized exceptions
for promises reaffirming debts discharged in bankruptcy, barred by the statute of
frauds, or incurred as an infant. See id. at 209.
23
168 So . 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935), reprinted in Farnsworth & Young, supra
note 2 , at 68-7 2.
24
See id. at 196-97.
25
See id . at 197 .
26
See id. at 198.
27
See id .
28
See F arnsworth & Yo ung, sup ra note 2, at 73.
29
Restatement (Sec ond ) of Co ntracts § 86 (1 981 ).
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decisions) as authority. 30 Numerous other casebooks reprint the same
cases, followed by section 86, in discussing the topic of past
consideration.31
This three-step approach to covering contracts doctrines has several
benefits. It demonstrates to first-year students that the law changes over
time. It shows them the typical direction of change that has occurred in the
twentieth century. It also informs students of the preferred view of the
American Law Institute and, therefore, presumably of the academy in
general.
Yet, despite achieving these pedagogic objectives, the approach raises
a difficult issue. After working through the pattern on one doctrine or
another, a student invariably will ask whether the new rule that is included
in the Restatement (Second) accurately reflects the current law, or instead
whether most courts still apply the traditional rule. This reasonable
question usually does not have an easy answer.
The American Law Institute’s decision to include a rule in the Restatement (Second) does not mean that a majority of courts have adopted that
rule. The Restatement (Second) strives to state the best rules, not
necessarily the rules that most courts have followed. As Professor Herbert
Wechsler stated in 1969 while serving as the Director of the American Law
Institute, “any statement that the law is such and such is more than an
empiric finding that decisions have so held. . . .[ I]t implies a normative
assertion as to what *511 should now be held, if and when the question is
presented.”32 Professor Farnsworth, who served as one of the Reporters to

30

Id. § 86 reporter’s note.
See, e.g., Randy E. Ba rnett, Contracts: Cases and Doctrine 688-98 (1995 );
Steven J. Burton, Principles of Contract Law 191-99 (1995); Thomas D. C randall
& Douglas J. W haley, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Contracts 204-15 (2d ed.
1993); John P. D awson et al., Cases and Comment on Contracts 233-47 (6th ed.
1993); Fuller & Eisenberg, supra note 1 6, at 17 0-79 ; Robert W. Ham ilton et al.,
Cases and Materials on Contracts 314-23 (2d ed. 1992 ); James F. Hogg & Carter
G. Bishop, Contracts: Cases, Problems and Materials 180-97 (1997); Charles L.
Knapp & N athan M . Crystal, P roblems in C ontract Law: Cases and Materials
165-76 (3d ed . 1993 ); Edward J. M urphy et al., Studies in Contract Law 139-50
(5th ed. 1997); Rosett, supra note 16, at 229-37; Robert E. Scott & D ouglas L.
Leslie, Contract Law and Theory 193-201 (2d ed. 1993); Robert S. Summ ers &
Robert A. Hillman, Contract and Related Obligation: Theory, Doctrine, and
Practice 144-5 6 (3d ed. 199 7).
32
Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150
(1969).
31
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the Restatement (Second), similarly has explained that “often a paucity of
cases or a confusion in the courts’ analyses makes it impossible starkly to
contrast innovation with tradition.”33
Most contracts casebooks, for this reason, contain a disclaimer before
quoting from the Restatement (Second). They typically caution students
that they cannot rely on the work as an accurate statement of the law. For
example, Professors Robert W. Hamilton, Alan Scott Rau, and Russell J.
Weintraub warn in their textbook: “The Restatement provisions are usually
drawn from case precedent, though they do not always reflect the ‘majority’
view. Sometimes a Restatement provision sets forth what the Reporter and
Advisers think the rule should be even though there is little precedent for
it.”34 Professor Steven J. Burton likewise explains in his casebook that the
law in some jurisdictions may differ from the provisions of the Restatement
(Second), but assures his readers that “the Restatement (Second). . . serves
as a conventional statement of ‘the modern view’ of the law, even when it
differs from the formal law on the books in a particular jurisdiction.”35
Disclaimers of this sort seem somewhat inadequate given the prominent
role of the Restatement (Second) throughout first-year contracts courses.
Students cannot critically think about the legal system unless they have an
accurate understanding of what courts actually do. Accordingly, they need
clear guidance on when the Restatement (Second) reflects actual contract
law and when it merely states a proposal that has not yet gone into practice.
To address this problem, I recently undertook a survey to determine how
courts have received some of the modern rules in the Restatement (Second).
My survey considered six important and innovative sections:
* Section 15(1)(b), which states a new rule for determining when a
mental illness or defect makes a promise voidable;36

33

E. Allan Farnsworth , Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
34
Hamilton et al., supra note 31, at 7.
35
Burton, sup ra note 31, at 11.
36
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)(b) (1981) (“A person incurs
only voidable contractual duties b y entering into a transaction if by reason of mental
illness or defect...(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the
transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.”).
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* Section 86, which states a new rule for when past services may serve
as a basis for enforcing promises; 37
* Section 87(2), which states a new rule for when reliance can make
an offer irrevocable;38

*512 * Section 89, which states a new rule on the enforceability of contract
modifications in view of unanticipated circumstances;39
* Section 139, which states a new rule on when reliance can make a
promise enforceable notwithstanding the statute of frauds;40 and
* Section 153, which states a new rule on when a unilateral mistake
can make a promise voidable.41
I analyzed these six sections because they typically arise in contracts
casebooks used by students during their first year of law school.42

37
See id. § 86(1) (“A p romise made in re cognition of a benefit previously
received by the promisor from the p romisee is binding to the extent necessary to
prevent injustice.”).
38
See id . § 87 (2) (“A n offer which the o fferor should reaso nably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree
before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as
an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.”).
39
See id . § 89 (a) (“A promise m odifying a duty under a co ntract no t fully
performed on eithe r side is b inding (a) if the modifica tion is fair and equitable in
view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was
mad e....”).
40
See id. § 139(1) (“A promise which the promisor should reasona bly expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce the action o r forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the
Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remed y granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires.”).
41
See id. § 153 (“W here a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made
as to a basic assumption on wh ich he mad e the contract has a material effect on the
agreed excha nge of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by
him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and (a)
the effect of the mistake is such that enforcem ent of the contract would be
unconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to kno w of the mistake or his fault
caused the mistake.”).
42
Farnsworth and Young cite all of these rules in their casebook . See Farnsworth & Young, supra note 2, at 73, 2 57-5 8, 30 7, 33 3, 35 6-57 , 801 . Other contracts
casebooks cite many o f them. See, e.g., Fuller & Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 130,
178-79, 409 , 699 (citing sections 86, 87 (2), 89, and 153 ); Hamilton et al., supra
note 31, at 298, 323, 476, 765, 894 (citing sections 15, 86, 87(2), 89, and 139);
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The study had an uncomplicated methodology. Almost thirty-five years
have passed since the American Law Institute began work on the Restatement of Contracts in 1963, and more than fifteen years have passed since
it published these rules in their final form in 1981.43 During this time, 241
cases from a wide variety of jurisdictions have cited these six sections.44
In conducting the survey, I simply read all of these cases. 45
The survey produced surprising results. Although the six sections
contradicted long-standing traditional rules--including black letter rules that
appeared in the original Restatement of Contracts46 (the “Restatement”)
published in 1932--courts almost universally accepted them. Only eight
decisions rejected or criticized the rules.47 The other cases cited the rules
favorably when applying them or discussing them in dicta.
The study does not answer the nagging question about whether the
Restatement (Second) accurately states the law in most jurisdictions, but it
takes *513 an important first step. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously
defined the law as merely a prediction about what a court will do when
presented with particular facts.48 Under that definition, the new rules in
sections 15(1)(b), 86(1), 87(2), 89(a), 139, and 153 certainly come close to
the status of law. In view of the overwhelming support for these provisions
to date, it is reasonable to predict that most courts will follow them in the
future.49
Although I initially had sought to determine only how courts had
received these new rules in the Restatement (Second), I observed an
unexpected phenomenon in reading the cases. In particular, most courts
simply deferred to the new rules. In the vast majority of cases, courts gave

Rosett, supra note 16, at 119-20, 236, 264, 562 (citing sections 15, 86, 87, and 89).
43
The Am erican Law Institute adopted and prom ulgated the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts at its annual meeting on May 17, 1979. Final publication of
the work, howe ver, did not occur until 198 1. See Restatement (Se cond) of Contracts
(1981).
44
See infra Appendix (listing cases).
45
For a compa rable study of how courts have responded to section 90, see
Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law
and the “Invisib le Ha ndshake,” 52 U . Chi. L. R ev. 90 3, 90 4, 90 7 (1985 ).
46
Restatement of Contracts (1932).
47
See infra Pa rt III.B.
48
See O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897)
(“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and no thing more p retentious,
are what I mean by the law.”).
49
See infra Pa rt V.
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no reasons for their decisions to embrace the six sections. They simply
cited them as they would cite a statute or code and did not question their
authority.
This practice raises an important normative question: Should courts
follow the Restatement (Second) as readily as they currently do? This
Article seeks to address that policy issue in addition to describing the
survey. It concludes that, although some arguments counsel against
deference to an academic work such as the Restatement (Second), on
balance, the practice does more good than harm. By deferring to the
Restatement (Second), courts have tended to promote uniformity and
certainty in the law of contracts and to conserve judicial resources.
Although deference to the Restatement (Second) may alter the substance
of the law in some jurisdictions, such changes generally do not have
deleterious consequences.
The remainder of this Article consists of four parts. Part II describes the
development of the Restatement and its successor, the Restatement
(Second). Part III describes the survey and shows the extent to which
courts have followed the six new rules. Part IV evaluates the propriety of
judicial deference to the Restatement (Second). Part V concludes by
predicting that even more decisions will support the new rules in the future.
II. The Restatement of Contracts
In the early 1920s, at the invitation of the American Association of Law
Schools, a group of prominent judges, legal scholars, and practicing
attorneys formed the “Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent
Organization for the Improvement of the Law.”50 This committee prepared
an influential report faulting the American legal system for its uncertainty
and complexity.51 The report proposed creating an institute that would
undertake projects to address these problems.52
*514 In 1923, in response to the report’s recommendation, Chief Justice
William Howard Taft, former Secretary of State Elihu Root, and others
formed a nonprofit organization called the American Law Institute

50

See Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American
Law Institute, reprinted in American Law Institute, T he American Law Institute--50th Anniversary 5, 12 (1973) [hereinafter Report].
51
See id . at 15-1 9.
52
See id. at 20-25 (discussing, specifically, the need for a restatement of the
law).
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(“ALI”).53 Over the past seventy years, the ALI has enjoyed a membership
of some of the most prominent lawyers, judges, and law professors in the
nation.54 In accordance with its founding objective, the ALI has undertaken numerous projects designed to improve the law, including the
creation of the Restatement and the Restatement (Second).
A. The Restatement of Contracts
In its first year of existence, the ALI decided that expert authorities
should examine the common law precedents in several areas of the law and
reduce them to a clear set of rules that lawyers and judges could follow.55
With funding from the Carnegie Corporation and the leadership of
Professor Samuel Williston, it undertook work on the subject of contracts.56
In 1932, after nine years of collaborative effort, the ALI completed and
published the two-volume Restatement.57
The Restatement contains a total of 609 sections addressing different
contract law doctrines.58 Each section contains a concisely stated rule of
law followed by an explanatory comment, which often includes illustrations.59 The sections do not provide citations justifying the rules; instead,
the ALI simply asserted that “[t]he accuracy of the statements of law made
rests on the authority of the Institute.”60
In compiling the Restatement, the ALI sought to state existing common
law rules in clear and simple terms. It did not desire to create new rules. 61
Although the authors of the Restatement occasionally had to choose
53

See R estatem ent of C ontracts at vii (1932); American Law Institute, About the
American Law Institute (visited Sept. 1, 1997) <http:// www.ali.org/ali/thisali.htm>.
54
The ALI has two kinds of mem bers. The “official members” include Supreme
Court Justices, Chief Justices of state courts of last resort, and various bar
association figures. T he “elected m emb ers” include respected attorneys, judges, and
law professors. See Restatement of Contracts at vii-viii; American Law Institute,
supra note 53.
55
See R estatem ent of C ontracts at xi-xii.
56
See id. at ix.
57
See id. at ix, xi. For additional history on the creation of the Restatement, see
Note, W hat Price Certainty? Corbin, W illiston, and the R estatement of Contracts,
70 B .U. L. Rev. 511 , 516 -22 (1 990 ).
58
See Restatement of Contracts at xvii-xli (listing the sections).
59
See, e.g., id. § 492 & cmt. (defining duress, explaining the definition, and
providing illustrations).
60
Id. at xi-xii.
61
See G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of
Mode rnist Jurisp rudence, 15 Law & Hist. Rev. 1, 2 3 (1997 ).
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among “very numerous and sometimes conflicting” cases,62 they believed
that their work reflected mainstream views. ALI Director William Draper
Lewis accordingly proclaimed that “there is reason to expect that the
Restatement of this and other subjects will be accepted by the courts and
legal profession *515 generally as prima facie a correct statement of what
may be termed the general common law of the United States.”63
The effort to state rules sometimes required creativity. For instance, in
the often-cited section 90, the Restatement declared that a court may
enforce a promise upon which the promisee has relied, even in the absence
of consideration.64 This provision contradicted judicial opinions holding
that reliance on a promise alone could not justify its enforcement.65 The
ALI, however, decided to include section 90 because courts often had
found ways to protect parties who relied on promises even if courts did not
explicitly acknowledge reliance as a basis for enforcement.66 Professor
Arthur L. Corbin, who participated in drafting the Restatement, explained:
“It is the belief of the present writer that the court decisions compel the
inclusion of some such rule as that adopted by the Institute, and that the
generally prevailing law never was inconsistent with it.”67 The Restatement
produced a mixed reaction upon its publication. 68 Most scholars praised
62

Restatement of Co ntracts at xi.
Id. at xiv.
64
See id . § 90 (“A promise which the promisor sho uld rea sonably exp ect to
induce action or forb earan ce of a definite and substantial character on the part of
the promisee and which doe s induce such action or forb earan ce is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”). The Restatement
gives the following exam ple: “A promises B not to foreclose for a specified time,
a mortgage which A ho lds on B’s land. B thereafter makes improvements on the
land. A’s promise is binding.” Id. § 90 illus. 1.
65
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scituate Sav. Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1884)
(Holmes, J.) (“It would cut up the d octrine of consideration b y the roo ts, if a
promisee could make a gratuito us promise binding by subsequently acting on
reliance on it.”).
66
See James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 547, 566-68 (1995)
(discussing the history of the decision to include section 90).
67
Arthur Linton Co rbin, C orbin on C ontracts 281 (1952 ).
68
For e arly commentary on the Restatement, see, for example, Charles E. Clark,
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 Yale L.J. 643 (1933); George W.
Goble, The Restatement of the Law o f Contracts, 21 Cal. L. Rev. 421 (1933);
Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 910
(1933); Charles E. Hughes, Restatement of Contracts Is Published by the American
Law Institute, 18 A.B.A. J. 775 (1932); Edwin W. Patterson, The Restatement of
the Law of Contracts, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 397 (19 33); and Clarke B. W hittier, The
63
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the work for its impressive scope and careful construction.69 Yet, many
writers also faulted it because they did not believe that common law
doctrines lent themselves to summary in simple black letter rules.70 Law
professors also criticized the failure of the ALI to offer citations to support
the rules.71 Despite these academic objections, the Restatement took the
judiciary by storm. Courts relied on the work heavily and ultimately cited
its rules in over twelve thousand cases.72 The ALI had sought to influence
judges and probably could not have hoped for more success.
*516 B. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
In 1962, with funding from the A.W. Mellon Educational and Charitable
Trust, the ALI began work on a revised version of the Restatement called
the Restatement (Second).73 Professor Robert Braucher served as the
Reporter until 1971;74 Professor E. Allan Farnsworth succeeded him and
served as Reporter until completion of the project in 1981.75 The Restatement (Second) contains 385 sections, considerably fewer than its predecessor.76 This reduction reflects an effort to condense and combine related
sections. As in the Restatement, the sections in the Restatement (Second)
each state a black letter rule and then have comments explaining the rule
and giving illustrations.77 Unlike the first Restatement, every section of the
Restatement (Second) contains a “Reporter’s Note.”78 These notes

Restatement of Contracts and Consideration, 18 Cal. L. Rev. 611 (19 30).
69
See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 1 (summarizing early reaction to the
Restatement).
70
See W hite, supra note 61, at 36 (“In review after review of the ea rly
Restatements critics demon strated their disaffinity with the jurisprudential
assumptions guiding the project.”).
71
See id .
72
See 1 979 Annu al Report, 56 A.L.I. Proc. 560 (1980) (noting that 12,580 cases
had cited the Restatement by 1979, the year in which the ALI adopted and
promulgated its successor, the Restatement (Second)).
73
See R estatem ent (Se cond) of Contracts at vii (1 981 ).
74
See id.
75
See id.; see also supra note 43 (discussing the completion date of the
Restatement (Second)).
76
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at ix-xxii (listing the sections).
77
See, e.g., id. § 175 & cmt. & illus. (stating when duress by threat makes a
contract voidable); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text (providing an
exam ple of this organization in the R estatement).
78
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 reporter’s note.
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typically list cases that support or, in some instances, contradict the
section’s rules, comments, and illustrations.79
The ALI officially explained its motivation for revising the original
Restatement by saying that changes in the law mandated “periodic
reexamination and revision.”80 Professor White, however, argues that the
ALI had a more specific reason for wanting a new version of the work. In
particular, he contends that the ALI found the original Restatement
intellectually inadequate in view of the scholarly criticism described
above.81 Whatever the impetus for the revision, most writers would agree
that the Restatement (Second) rests on a different philosophy from the
Restatement. In the first publication, the ALI sought only to clarify the law
and not to change it.82
The ALI, for this reason, generally avoided
including new or controversial rules. The Restatement (Second) differs
considerably in this regard.
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) did not seek merely to state
rules that courts in a majority of jurisdictions had adopted. They sought
instead to express a “normative” view about what rules courts should
apply. 83 In many instances, they chose rules that had little support at the
time, but that further policies the ALI considers important.84 Sections
15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 all would appear to fall into this
category.85 The Reporter’s Notes describe these sections as “new” because
they state rules that *517 did not appear in the Restatement.86 These notes
generally contain few citations to cases, but instead rely heavily on
academic commentary as authority.87
This shift in philosophy apparently has not lessened the ALI’s influence
on the judiciary. A total of over twenty-four thousand cases now have cited

79

See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 4 (discussing the creation of the “reporter’s
notes”).
80
Restatement (Sec ond ) of Co ntracts at vii.
81
See W hite, supra note 61, at 46; supra notes 70-71 and accompa nying text.
82
See su pra note 61 and acco mpa nying text.
83
W echsler, supra note 3 2, at 15 0.
84
See Farnsworth, supra note 33, at 5-7.
85
See infra Pa rt III.B. (discussing each of the se pro visions in depth).
86
See Restatement (Sec ond ) of Co ntracts § 15 re porter’s note (1981); id. § 87
repo rter’s note; id. § 89 reporter’s note; id. § 139 reporter’s note; id. § 153
reporter’s note.
87
See, e.g., id. § 15 re porter’s note (relying on numerous law review articles and
other legal publications).
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the Restatement and the Restatement (Second).88 Moreover, courts
generally have followed the new rules in the Restatement (Second) even
though they differ from traditional rules.89
III. Judicial Reception of New Rules in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts
To determine how courts received the new rules in sections 15(1)(b), 86,
87(2), 89, and 139, I examined all of the cases that have cited them. The
following discussion first explains the methodology of the survey. It then
reports the number of cases that have cited each of the sections favorably
and unfavorably. Finally, it describes the reasons for courts’ general
acceptance of the new rules.
A. Survey Methodology
I obtained lists of cases citing the six new rules from two sources. First,
I gathered all of the citations included in the 1982, 1986, 1990, 1993, and
1997 appendices to the Restatement (Second).90 These appendices strive
to list all judicial decisions that have cited the Restatement (Second) in its
final published form or in earlier circulated drafts. Second, I collected all
of the citations of the six sections included in the 1994 main volume and
the March 1997 appendix of Shepard’s Restatement of the Law Citations.91
Several factors required researching both sources. Unlike the appendices to the Restatement (Second), Shepard’s does not include cases that
cited preliminary versions of the six sections that appeared in published
drafts before 1979. The Shepard’s appendix, however, contains some
recent citations that have not yet been published in a Restatement (Second)
appendix. In addition, each source lists a few cases that the other should
include but, for some unknown reason, does not; some citations in the
appendices do not appear in Shepard’s, 92 and some citations in Shepard’s

88

See 74 A.L.I. Ann. Rep. 25 (19 97).
See infra Pa rt III.B.
90
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at app. 6 (1982), app. 7 (1986), app.
8 (1990 ), app. 9 (1993), & app . 10 (1997).
91
Shepard’s Restatement of the Law Citations (3d ed. 1994 & ap p. Mar. 1997).
92
See, e.g., Quigley v. W ilson, 47 4 N.W .2d 277, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991)
(citing section 89); Bragdon v. D rew, 658 A.2d 6 66, 668-69 (M e. 1995) (citing
section 15).
89
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do not appear in the appendices.93 Looking at both sources thus provided
a method of double-checking my research.
*518 B. The New Rules and Their Reception
A total of 241 cases cited the six new rules contained in sections
15(1)(b), 86, 87, 89, 139, and 153.94 Of these cases, only eight rejected the
rules or otherwise referred to them negatively. The other 233 adopted and
applied the rules or at least cited them favorably in dicta. The following
paragraphs discuss each of these sections and the results of the survey in
more detail.
1. Section 15(1)(b)
Contract law allows a person to void a promise that he or she made
while lacking mental capacity. Courts traditionally have judged a person’s
mental capacity by examining the person’s ability to understand the
promise. 95 Section 15(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) retains this
standard, permitting a party to void a promise if “he [wa]s unable to
understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the

93

See, e.g., Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822, 829
(N.M . 1996) (citing section 87); Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519
N.Y.S.2d 973, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987 ) (Sandler, J., concurring) (citing section
15).
94
This count requires four qualifications. First, this figure includes a few cases
in which o nly a concurring or dissenting opinion cited one o f the sections. See , e.g.,
In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App . Div. 198 9) (W eiss,
J., dissenting) (citing section 15). The following discussion singles ou t most of these
cases for spe cial treatm ent. Second, in the rare instance that a case discussed more
than one of the six sections, the case was counted once for each section cited. For
example, W achovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 755-56, 759
(N.C. 1982), was counted as two cases because it cited both sections 89 and 139.
Third, superior and inferior court decisions were counted as separate cases. For
instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Estate of McGo vern v.
Comm onwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526 -27 (Pa. 1986 ), and the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court’s decision in Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481
A.2d 981 , 984 -86 (P a. Co mmw. Ct. 198 4), were counted as two cases. Fourth, this
figure does not include cases that erroneously cited one of the six sections when the
court apparently intended to refer to some other provision. See, e.g., Altevogt v.
Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 19 81) (citing sec tion 13 9, but apparently
referring to som e other provision).
95
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.6, at 240 (2d ed. 1990); 1 Samuel
W illiston, The Law of Contracts § 256, at 500 (1929).
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transaction.”96 Section 15(1)(b), however, now includes an alternative test
that allows a person to void a promise if “he [wa]s unable to act in a
reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party ha[d]
reason to know of his condition.”97 Under the alternative rule, the person’s
ability to understand the promise does not matter.
Many casebooks teach the new alternative using Ortelere v. Teachers’
Retirement Board.98 In that case, a woman named Ortelere exercised an
option under her retirement plan while suffering from cerebral arteriosclerosis.99 The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that New York
cases previously had relied on a cognitive test of understanding to
determine mental capacity, but decided to update the law based on what it
considered *519 advances in “psychiatric knowledge.”100 At the time of the
decision, the ALI had not yet published the Restatement (Second), but it
had circulated preliminary drafts. The Court of Appeals cited and followed
a draft version of what is now section 15(1)(b),101 explaining that even if
Ortelere could understand the transaction, she might not have been able to
act in a reasonable manner.102

96

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)(a) (1981).
Id. § 1 5(1)(b).
98
250 N.E .2d 4 60 (N.Y . 196 9).
99
See id . at 461 -62.
100
Id. at 464.
101
See id. at 465 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 18C (T entative
Dra ft No. 1, 1964)). In a somewhat circular manner, the repo rter’s note to the final
version of section 15(1)(b ) cites O rtelere fo r supp ort. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 15 re porter’s note.
102
See Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 464 (“O nce it is understood that, accepting
plaintiff’s proof, Mrs. Ortelere was psychotic and because of that psychosis could
have been incapable of making a voluntary selection of her retirement system
benefits, there is an issue that a mod ern jurisprud ence should not exclude , merely
because her mind could pass a ‘cognition’ test based on nineteenth century
psychology.”).
97
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The survey found twenty-two cases citing section 15.103 Only one of
these cases cited the provision in a negative manner. In Estate of McGovern
v. Commonwealth State Employees’ Retirement Board,104 the trial court
followed the new rule in section 15(1)(b), but the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed and simply stated that the rule did not reflect Pennsylvania
law.105
A vigorous dissent, however, urged adoption of section
15(1)(b).106
2. Section 86
Traditional statements of contract law reject the concept of “past” or
“moral” consideration. They say that a promisor does not have to keep a
promise merely because the promisor, prior to making the promise,
received something from the promisee.107 Unless the promisor bargained
for the benefit*520 from the promisee, a court cannot find consideration

103

See infra Ap pendix. T he citations cam e from federal courts within the First,
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, and from local courts in Alaska, the District of
Columbia, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and
W isconsin. Some of these cases cited section 15 generally, without singling out
subsection(1)(b). Two cases, both from New York, cited section 15 only in dissent.
See In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(W eiss, J., dissenting); Tomasino v. New York State Emp. Ret. Sys., 448 N.Y.S.2d
819, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Weiss, J., dissenting), aff’d, 440 N.E.2d 1300
(N.Y. 1982). The majority opinions in these two cases, however, did not reject the
rule in section 15(1)(b), which the New Yo rk courts have followed since Ortelere.
See, e.g., Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987) (implicitly adopting section 15(1)(b) by holding that contracts are
voidable if one party suffers from psychosis about which the other party knew or
should have known).
104
481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984), rev’d, 517 A.2d 523 (Pa.
1986).
105
517 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. 1986) (“This Court has never adopted Section 15 of
the Restatement, which requires a post--hoc determination of reaso nableness, and
we decline to do so now.” ).
106
See id. at 530 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (“I would adopt the principles set forth
in the Restatement of the Law of Contract Second, § 15, apply those principles to
this case, and affirm the Comm onwealth Court.”).
107
See C orbin, supra note 6 7, § 2 30, at 321 ; Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 2.8,
at 54, 57-58; 1 W illiston, supra note 95, §§ 142, 148, at 317-19, 329-31. For
categories tha t traditionally were exclud ed fro m this rule, see sup ra note 22.
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and cannot enforce the promise.108 The Mills v. Wyman case illustrates this
traditional view.109
The Restatement (Second) creates an exception to the traditional rule.
Adopting the approach used in Webb v. McGowin,110 section 86 states: “A
promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the
promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent
injustice.”111 The survey found four cases citing section 86.112 All of
these cases treated the rule favorably.
3. Section 87(2)
A person who makes an offer generally can revoke it at any time prior
to acceptance unless he or she has entered into a binding contract (called
an “option contract”) to keep the offer open.113 Traditional statements of
contract law say that an offeror can form a binding option contract only by
promising to keep the offer open and receiving consideration for the
promise.114 The requirements of a promise and consideration, however,
may produce hardship because sometimes an offeree relies on an offer even
if the offeror has not bargained to keep it open.
Many casebooks illustrate this potential hardship with Drennan v. Star
Paving Co.115 In that case, a subcontractor made an offer to a general
contractor to do some paving work for a fixed price.116 The general

108

See R estatem ent of C ontracts § 75 cm t. b (19 32) (stating the tradition al rule
that “[c]onsideration must actually be bargained for as the exchange for the
promise”).
109
See su pra notes 17-22 and accompa nying text.
110
See su pra notes 23-27 and accompa nying text.
111
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86(1) (1981). For further discussion of
section 86, see Steve Thel & Edward Yo rio, T he Promissory B asis of P ast
Consideration, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 10 58-67 (199 2) (describing the development
of section 86). See also Gordley, supra note 66, at 597-98 (presenting an interesting
theory of the nature of the injustice su ffered in a case cove red b y section 86).
112
See infra Appendix. These cases came from a federal district court in Kansas,
and from state courts in Arizona, California, and Missouri. See infra Appendix; see
also Graves v. Sawyer, 588 S.W .2d 542, 544 (Tenn. 197 9) (citing section 86 but
apparently intending to refer to some other provision).
113
See Restatement (Sec ond) o f Contracts § 47 (stating the rule for “Revocation
of Divisible O ffer”).
114
See Corbin, supra note 67, § 31, at 50; Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 3.25, at
199; 1 Williston, supra note 95, § 55, at 94.
115
333 P.2d 75 7 (Cal. 1958) (in banc).
116
See id. at 758.
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contractor relied on this offer in preparing a bid.117 After the general
contractor submitted the bid and obtained the contract, the subcontractor
attempted to withdraw its offer, and the general contractor could not find
anyone else to do the work for the same price.118 Under traditionally stated
principles of contract law, the subcontractor could have revoked the
offer.119 Because the subcontractor*521 had not promised to keep the offer
open, no option contract existed.120 In an opinion by Justice Roger Traynor,
however, the California Supreme Court rejected this position and held that
an offeror cannot revoke an offer if the offeror knew that the offeree would
rely on it.121
The Restatement (Second) adopts the rule in Drennan as an exception
to the traditional view that an offeror remains free to revoke an offer absent
a bargain to keep the offer open.122 Section 87(2) states: “An offer which
the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to
the extent necessary to avoid injustice.”123 Under this section, reliance on
an offer may create an option contract that precludes revocation even if the
offeror has not promised to keep the offer open.

117

See id .
See id. at 758-59.
119
See Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 3.25, at 199 (noting that, under “traditional
contract doctrine,” a su bco ntracto r could revoke an offer “in spite of reliance by the
general contractor,” and explaining that the California Supreme Court “made a
dram atic departure from this traditional ana lysis” in Drennan).
120
See id. § 4.21, at 287 (explaining but questioning this logic).
121
See D rennan, 333 P.2d at 760 .
122
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87 reporter’s note (1981) (citing
Drennan). For further discussion of section 87(2), see Avery Katz, W hen Should
an Offer S tick? T he Economic s of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249, 1261-66 (1996) (discussing the development of section
87(2)), and Charles L. Knapp , Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 52, 62-67 (198 1) (same).
123
Restatement (Sec ond ) of Co ntracts § 87(2).
118
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The survey found twenty-one cases citing section 87(2).124 None of the
cases rejected section 87(2) or otherwise referred to it in a negative manner.
Two cases, although not unfavorable, stood out as somewhat unusual. In
Pearl v. Merchants-Warren National Bank, 125 the Appeals Court of
Massachusetts cited a draft version of section 87(2) to support the
proposition that “[a]n option given without consideration is revocable at
any time by the offeror.”126 This citation seems a little odd because section
87(2) creates an exception to that rule. In Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S.
Johnson Co.,127 the Court of Appeals of Maryland cited section 87(2) and
accepted the idea that reliance can make an offer binding.128 Yet, the court
analyzed the issue primarily under the general promissory estoppel rule in
section 90 rather than the specific rule for offers in section 87(2).129 This
decision also seems peculiar because offers are not promises.
*522 4. Section 89
As described above in the discussion of Arzani and Watkins, one party
to a contract sometimes encounters unforeseen circumstances when the
time for performance arrives.130 For example, a contractor may face
increased labor costs, or an excavator may discover hidden bedrock. In
these cases, the other party might promise to pay more money or consent
to change the specifications in order to obtain the previously agreed upon
performance.
124

See infra Appendix. The citations came from federal courts within the D .C.,
Second, Third, S ixth, and Eleventh Circuits, and from the U.S. Court of Claims, and
from state courts in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, New M exico, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Some of these cases cited section 87
generally, without singling out subsection (2). Cases that cited only section 87(1)
or its predecessors were not counted. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834,
836 (Idaho 1980 ) (citing the tentative draft of section 87); Johnson v. Norton Hou s.
Auth., 375 N.E.2 d 1209, 12 11 (M ass. 1978) (same). One New York case cited
section 87(2) in dissent, see Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245,
1251 (N.Y. 1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting), but the majority opinion did not reject the
rule. See id. at 1246-48. The New Y ork C ourt of App eals has cited the rule
favorably. See De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., 508 N.E.2d 652, 655 (N.Y.
1987).
125
400 N .E.2d 1314 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980 ).
126
Id. at 1315.
127
674 A.2d 521 (M d. 19 96).
128
See id. at 529-30.
129
See id . at 531 -32.
130
See su pra notes 3-12 and ac com panying text.
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Traditional statements of contract doctrine say that these subsequent
promises lack consideration.131 The party making the promise, the logic
runs, is not receiving anything in exchange because the other party has a
preexisting duty to perform.132 The Restatement (Second) retains this rule
in section 73, which states: “Performance of a legal duty to a promisor
which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration.”133
The Restatement (Second), however, contains a new section based on
Watkins that sometimes makes this kind of subsequent promise enforceable
even if it lacks consideration. Section 89 provides:
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed
on either side is binding (a) if the modification is fair and equitable
in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the
contract was made; or (b) to the extent provided by statute; or (c)
to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material
change of position in reliance on the promise.134 Under section 89,
if a party encounters unexpected difficulties, the other party does not
have to promise to pay more money or to change the specifications.
Yet, if the other party does make such a promise, courts will enforce
it if enforcement would be “fair and equitable” in view of the
circumstances or, in some instances, if the aggrieved party relied on
the promise.135 The aggrieved party’s preexisting duty to perform
would not matter.

131

See Corbin, supra note 67, § 184 , at 265 -66; Farnsworth, sup ra note 95, §
4.21 , at 287 ; 3 W illiston, supra note 95, § 13 0, at 27 5-76 .
132
See Corbin, supra note 67, § 184, at 265-66; Farnsworth, sup ra note 95, §
4.21 at 287; 3 Williston, supra note 95, § 130, at 276.
133
Restatement (Sec ond ) of Co ntracts § 73 (1 981 ).
134
Id. § 89. For further discussion of the development of section 89, see Knapp,
supra note 122, at 71-76 (discussing the history of the inclusion of the provision),
and Subha Narasimhan, Of Exp ectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain
Principle, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1123, 11 84-87 (198 6) (same). See also Robert A.
Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67
Cornell L. Rev. 680, 692-702 (1982) (criticizing section 89 for lack of clarity and
unde rinclusive ness).
135
See R estatem ent (Se cond) of Contracts § 89.
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The survey found twenty-one cases citing section 89.136 Only one case
cited section 89 in a negative or, at least, potentially negative way. In
Wachovia*523 Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish,137 the North Carolina
Supreme Court stated the traditional preexisting duty rule as follows: “[A]n
agreement to waive a substantial right or privilege, thus altering the terms
of the original contract, must be supported by additional consideration, or
an estoppel must be shown.”138 After this statement, the court included the
following citation: “But see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981)
(modification of executory contract needs no consideration if fair and
equitable in light of unanticipated circumstances or if allowed by statute or
if detrimental reliance).”139 The “but see” signal makes the court’s position
on section 89 difficult to determine. The signal may imply that the court
does not agree with the rule in section 89, but wants to acknowledge the
existence of contrary authority. Alternatively, the signal may indicate that
the court recognizes an exception to the general rule that it has stated.
5. Section 139
Section 90, as described above, adopts promissory estoppel as a basis
for enforcing contracts.140 When courts first began to use the rule stated in
section 90, they saw reliance as a substitute for consideration. 141 Some
litigants, however, sought to use promissory estoppel to enforce unwritten
promises falling within the statute of frauds.142 In the leading case of
Monarco v. Lo Greco,143 however, Justice Roger Traynor writing for the

136

See infra Appendix. These cases came from federal courts within the D .C.,
First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, and state courts in Connecticut,
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New
York, Ohio , Rhode Island, and W yoming. T wo cases cited section 89 o nly in
dissent, but the majority opinions in these cases d id not reject the rule. See Sc holz
v. Montgo mery W ard & Co., 468 N.W .2d 845, 854 (M ich. 19 91) (Levin, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452
N.E.2d 1 245, 125 1 (N.Y. 19 83) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
137
293 S.E.2 d 74 9 (N .C. 19 82).
138
Id. at 755 (emphasis omitted).
139
Id.
140
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90.
141
See F arnsworth, sup ra note 95, § 2.1 9, at 92 , 95-9 6.
142
Courts pre viously had allowed parties to use eq uitable (as opposed to
promissory) estoppel to preclude defendants from denying that they had signed a
sufficient writing. See id. § 6.12, at 454-55 (contrasting equitable and promissory
estoppel); 1 Williston, supra note 95, § 98, at 187 (discussing esto ppe l in general).
143
220 P.2d 73 7 (Cal. 1950) (in banc).
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California Supreme Court accepted this argument, enforcing an unwritten
promise on grounds that the promisee had relied.144
In drafting the Restatement (Second), the ALI adopted the approach of
cases like Monarco and concluded that courts should have the power to use
promissory estoppel to overcome the statute of frauds.145 Section 139(1)
states:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided
*524 only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach is to be limited as justice requires.146
The survey found eighty-four cases citing section 139.147 Six of these
cases cited section 139 negatively. Of these six cases, four categorically
rejected the provision; a federal district court applying Pennsylvania law,
the Washington Supreme Court (in a pair of cases), and the Indiana Court
of Appeals all concluded that reliance could not overcome the statute of
frauds in any circumstance.148 The Maine Supreme Court also rejected
144

See id. at 740-41.
See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 19-48,
at 842 & n.61 (3d ed. 1987); see also Knapp, supra note 122, at 67-71 (describing
the develop ment of section 139 and the change that it made in the law).
146
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (198 1).
147
See infra Ap pendix. T he cases cam e from federal co urts within the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, N inth, and Tenth circu its, and fro m state
courts in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Y ork, No rth Carolina, O hio, Oregon, Texas,
W ashington, W est Virginia, Wisconsin, and W yoming. The count does not include
one case that cited section 139, but apparently meant to refer to another section. See
Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1981). One case from Michigan
cited section 139 only in dissent. See Powers v. Peo ples C omm unity Hosp. Auth.,
465 N.W .2d 566, 567 (Mich. 1991 ) (Levin, J., dissenting). The following
discussion describes the Michigan case in detail. See infra notes 154-156 and
acco mpa nying text.
148
See Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa.
1989) (rejecting section 139 on the basis of Polka v. May, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa.
1955)), aff’d mem., 899 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1990); Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Ko pani,
514 N.E .2d 8 40, 8 44-4 5 (Ind . Ct. App. 1987 ) (generally rejecting section 139);
Greaves v. Medica l Imaging Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 2 76, 2 83 (W ash. 19 94) (generally
rejecting section 139); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107
(W ash. 1981) (rejecting section 139 in a case involving section 2-201 of the UCC).
145
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section 139 in the employment context without deciding its applicability in
other contexts. 149 The Missouri Court of Appeals similarly suggested that
section 139 should not apply in employment cases.150 As explained more
fully below, these courts mostly reasoned that judges could not make
exceptions to a statute (i.e., the statute of frauds) in a common law
manner.151
A number of other decisions also deserve mention, although they did not
cite section 139 negatively. Five federal and state cases applying New
York law cited section 139 in a generally favorable manner, but held that
a plaintiff seeking to overcome the statute of frauds also must show that
failure to enforce a promise would produce an “unconscionable” injury.152
In a sense, these courts have added an element to section 139. Six other
decisions (five applying Washington law and one applying Maine law)
expressly declined*525 to adopt or reject section 139.153 One dissenting
opinion cited section 139 favorably in circumstances suggesting that the

149

See Stearns v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A .2d 72, 74-75 (M e. 1991)
(“[W ]e decline [plaintiff’s] invitation to accept promissory estoppel as permitting
avoidance of the statute in emp loyme nt contracts that require longer than one year
to perform. Although section 139 of the Restatement may promote justice in other
situations, in the em ploym ent context it contravenes the po licy of the Statute to
prevent fraud. It is too easy for a disgruntled former employee to allege reliance on
a promise, but difficult factually to distinguish such reliance from the ordinary
prep arations that atten d any new em ploym ent.” (emph asis om itted)).
150
See McCoy v. Spelman Mem’l Hosp., 845 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (distinguishing the employment relationship from other contractual
relationships).
151
See infra Pa rt IV.A .1.
152
See Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rosenthal
v. Kingsley, 674 F. Supp. 1113 , 1125 (S.D.N .Y. 198 7); Klein v. Jam or Purveyors,
Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch
Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299, 302 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 472 N.E.2d 992, 996
(N.Y. 1984); Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 26 6, 269 (N.Y . App. Div.
1980).
153
See Chapman v. B omann, 381 A .2d 1123 , 1130 n.6 (M e. 1978); Berg v.
Ting, 886 P.2d 56 4, 57 3-74 (W ash. 1995) (en banc); Family Med . Bldg., Inc. v.
Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 702 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Wa sh. 1985) (en banc);
Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier Nat’l Bank, 647 P.2d 1001, 1001-02 (Wash. 1982) (en
banc); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P .2d 644, 648 (Wa sh.
1980) (en banc); see also Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp., 922 P.2d 115, 122-23
(W ash. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the Washington Supreme Court rejected section
139 in Lige and Greaves, but distinguishing those dec isions in a case involving part
perfo rmance), rev . granted , 936 P.2d 41 6 (W ash. 19 97).
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majority did not accept the rule. In that case, the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that the statute of frauds barred enforcement of an oral
promise without considering section 139.154 The Michigan Supreme Court
denied leave to appeal.155 A dissent from the denial, however, asserted that
the Court of Appeals should have considered the section.156
6. Section 153
Occasionally, after two parties form a contract, one of them will realize
that he or she made a mistake and will not want to perform. For example,
a subcontractor might offer to do work for fifty thousand dollars, but later
discover that, because of a mathematical error, it should not have offered
less than seventy-five thousand dollars. Traditional statements of contract
doctrine generally do not recognize a unilateral mistake as a defense to
nonperformance or ground for rescission.157 Section 503 of the first
Restatement, for instance, said that “[a] mistake of only one party that
forms the basis on which he enters into a transaction does not of itself
render the transaction voidable.”158
The traditional rule that unilateral mistakes do not make a contract
voidable has an exception for mistakes caused by the other party’s failure
to disclose the facts. Section 472(1)(b) of the first Restatement said:
“There is no privilege of non-disclosure, by a party who. . . knows that the
other party is acting under a mistake as to undisclosed material facts.”159
Section 472(2) then made clear that “[w]here non-disclosure is not
privileged it has the effect of a material misrepresentation”160 and accordingly may justify rescission of the contract.
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) decided to “liberalize][“ the
exception to the traditional rule that a unilateral mistake does not make a
contract voidable.161 Section 153 now provides:

154
See Pow ers v. Peoples Community Hosp. Auth., 455 N.W.2d 371, 373-74
(Mich. Ct. App. 199 0).
155
Powers v. P eop les Co mmunity Hosp. Auth., 465 N .W .2d 5 66, 566 (Mich.
199 1).
156
See id. at 566 (Levin, J., dissenting from denial of leave to appeal).
157
See Farnsworth, supra note 95, § 9.4, at 693; 3 Williston, supra note 95,
§ 15 78, at 279 2.
158
Restatement of Contracts § 503 (1932).
159
Id. § 4 72(1)(b ).
160
Id. § 472(2).
161
Restatement (Sec ond ) of Co ntracts § 153 repo rter’s note (19 81).
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*526 Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made
as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a
material effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is
adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if he does not bear
the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and
(a) the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the
contract would be unconscionable, or
(b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault
caused the mistake.162
Section 153 changes the traditional doctrine stated in the original
Restatement in two ways. First, a unilateral mistake can render a contract
voidable if “enforcement of [such] contract would be unconscionable”
whether or not the nonmistaken party had a duty of disclosure.163 Second,
a unilateral mistake can render a contract voidable if the nonmistaken party
had “reason to know of the mistake,” even if he or she did not have actual
knowledge of the mistake.164
The survey found eighty-nine cases citing section 153.165 None of these
cases rejected section 153 or cited it in a negative manner. Three cases,
however, found the elements of the section unsatisfied without deciding

162

Id. § 153.
Id.
164
Id.
165
See infra Appendix. The cases came from the United States Supreme Court,
the United States Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims, and from other federal
courts within every circuit but the First Circuit and Federal Circuit. They also came
from local courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, D elaware, the
District of Colum bia, Florida, G eorgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, M assachusetts,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Five of these cases
cited section 153 only in dissenting opinions, but the majority opinions in these
cases did no t reject the rule stated by the section. See Middle E. B anking Co. v.
State St. Bank Int’l, 821 F.2d 897, 910 (2d C ir. 1987) (Maho ney, C.J., concurring
in part & dissenting in part); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 235 n.14
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Greene, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Waggoner v.
W aggoner, 383 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Karns, J., dissenting), aff’d,
398 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Ill. 1979) (citing tentative draft); Alperin v. Eastern Smelting &
Ref. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 1122, 1131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (Fine, J., dissenting);
Cortesi v. R & D C onstr. C orp., 524 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff’d,
534 N.E .2d 3 13 (N.Y . 198 8).
163
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whether to adopt the section as the governing law.166 One case oddly cited
section 153 in support of the proposition that unilateral mistakes cannot
void a contract.167
*527 C. Why Courts Have Favored the New Rules
Why did so many courts decide to follow these six sections even though
they state new rules of contract law? Although some of the cases surveyed
offered explanations for their acceptance, the vast majority did not. Most
courts simply cited the new rules and applied them without comment. The
precise reasons that the rules have caught on, as a result, necessarily remain
a matter of some speculation.
Careful consideration of the cases, however, suggests four explanations
for the favorable reception of the new rules in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2),
89, 139, and 153. First, a few courts appear to have followed the rules on
grounds of precedent. Second, a few other courts appear to have followed
the new rules for policy reasons. Third, several other courts adopted the
rules because statutes or case law require them to follow the Restatement
(Second) absent contrary authority. Fourth, the remaining courts appear to
have accepted the rules on grounds of convenience; rather than examine
precedent or policy arguments, courts voluntarily deferred to the ALI’s
view of what the law should be. The following discussion describes each
of these four reasons for the success of the new rules.
1. Precedent
The foregoing portion of this Article describes the six rules in sections
15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 as new because the rules contradict
traditional statements of contract doctrine. The adjective “new,” however,
requires some qualification. In two types of situations the rules may not

166

See In re Conservatorship of Estate of O’Connor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386,
398-99 (Cal. C t. App . 199 6); D a Silva v. M usso, 428 N.E.2d 382, 386-87 (N.Y.
1981); Erickson by Wightman v. Gundersen, 515 N.W.2d 293, 299 -300 (W is. Ct.
App. 1994) (noting that no Wisconsin case had adopted the rule but finding
elements unsatisfied).
167
See Warren v. Greenfield, 595 A.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
The court said that “unilateral mistakes will not void a contract.” Id. at 1313. It
then cited comment (a) to section 153, which explains that “[courts are] reluctant
to allow a party to avoid a contra ct on the ground of mistake, even as to a basic
assumption, if the mistake was not shared by the other party.” Id. at 131 3 n.4
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 cmt. a) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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have appeared novel to courts that applied them. On the contrary, courts
may have felt bound by applicable precedent to follow them.
First, in a few instances courts may have felt compelled to follow the
rules because their jurisdictions already had adopted essentially the same
rules prior to the publication of the Restatement (Second). Despite the
general novelty of the six rules considered, the ALI actually did not invent
them; indeed the Reporter’s Notes for each of the six sections cite at least
a few cases supporting the rules.168 As a result, some courts that followed
the sections may have felt that precedent compelled their decisions.
Consider, for example, section 139. This section states what I have
characterized as a “new” rule on using promissory estoppel to overcome the
statute of frauds.169 The rule, however, is not entirely novel. The California
Supreme Court in fact adopted essentially the same rule in 1950 in
Monarco v. Lo Greco.170 Accordingly, when courts in California cite
section 139, they *528 are not really adopting a new rule. Instead, they
simply are citing a secondary source that restates preexisting California
law. The Monarco precedent requires them to follow the rule.
In conducting the survey, I found it difficult to determine exactly how
many of the 241 cases that cited the new rules could have relied instead on
precedent. Most decisions, as noted, simply did not give reasons. Yet,
probably only a few cases followed the rules because they reflected
preexisting precedents; the Reporter’s Notes themselves confirm that only

168

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15 repo rter’s note (citing Ortelere
v. Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969) and other cases); id. §
86 reporter’s note (citing Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) and other
cases); id. § 87 rep orter’s note (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co ., 333 P.2d 757
(Cal. 1958) and other cases); id. § 89 reporter’s note (citing Watkins & Son v.
Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941) and other cases); id. § 139 repo rter’s note (citing
M cIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177 (Haw. 1970) and other cases); id. § 153
repo rter’s note (citing Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d
713 (Cal. 1960 ) and other cases).
169
See id . § 13 9.
170
220 P .2d 737, 740 -41 (Cal. 1950) (in banc). See Paul T. W agerin, Damages
for Reliance A cross the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal Elephants, 72
Iowa L. Rev. 47, 77 n.220 (1986 ) (“The sub stantive p rinciple of Monarco is now
enshrined in § 139....”).
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a handful of jurisdictions actually had adopted the rules prior to publication
of the Restatement (Second).171
Second, in other instances courts may have felt compelled to follow the
new rules because of precedent arising after the ALI formulated the rules.
For example, in Ortelere described above,172 the New York Court of
Appeals cited and adopted the rule in section 15(1)(b).173 At the time of
that decision, the rule had little or no support in the cases and could be
considered a new rule. Subsequent New York cases, however, must treat
the Ortelere decision as precedent. As a result, when lower courts in New
York now cite section 15(1)(b), they no longer really are adopting a new
rule. For this reason, the number of jurisdictions that have adopted the rules
in some respects provides a better gauge of the ALI’s influence than the
number of cases that have cited them favorably.174
2. Policy
Although some courts may have approved the new rules on grounds of
precedent, others based their decisions on policy grounds. For example, the
Colorado Supreme Court in Kiely v. St. Germain175 carefully considered the
policies behind both the statute of frauds and the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. 176 It concluded that the legislature would want courts to “utilize
a balancing test to prevent use of the statute [of frauds] to effect inequitable
results.”177 It thus decided to follow section 139.178
The survey, however, found few decisions even remotely similar to
Kiely. 179 Several courts described a new rule with a favorable adjective,
such as “appropriate” or, ironically, “mainstream.”180 Most courts, however,
171

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15 reporter’s note; id. § 86
repo rter’s note; id. § 87 re porter’s note; id. § 89 rep orter’s note; id. § 139 repo rter’s
note; id. § 15 3 rep orter’s note.
172
See su pra notes 98-10 2 and acco mpa nying text.
173
See O rtelere, 2 50 N .E.2d at 465.
174
See infra Appendix (organizing cases by jurisdiction).
175
670 P.2d 76 4 (Colo. 1 983 ) (en banc).
176
See id. at 767-70.
177
Id. at 770.
178
See id. at 769.
179
The New York Court of Appeals carefully considered the policy argum ents
for the new rule in section 15(1)(b ) in Ortelere. See 25 0 N .E.2d at 465.
180
See, e.g., McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66
F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir.) (describing section 89 as an “appropriate exception to the
preexisting duty rule”), opinion corrected on denial of reh’g, 70 F.3d 26 (5 th Cir.
1995); Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 11 2, 116 (4th Cir.

IPSE DIXIT

29

simply*529 cited the new rules from the Restatement (Second) without
comment. The opinions in these cases did not indicate that the courts had
any views about the substance of the rules.
True, some courts may have decided to follow the rules for policy
reasons even if they did not discuss those reasons. Yet, this practice
probably did not occur often. The notes and illustrations in the Restatement (Second) strive to explain the rules, but usually say little about their
rationale.181 Working through all of the policy arguments for the rules
would require some effort, and courts undertaking that effort in a serious
fashion in most instances probably would say something about it in their
opinions.
3. Mandated Deference
A couple of courts involved in the survey followed the new rules in the
Restatement (Second) for reasons unrelated to precedent or the policy
arguments in favor of the rules. Instead they adopted the rules because
statutes or case law in their jurisdictions require courts to defer to the ALI’s
various Restatements. In these rare instances, the Restatement (Second)
acts something like a code of contract law.
Legislation in the Virgin Islands, for example, makes all of the ALI’s
Restatements binding unless contradicted by other law. The Virgin Islands
Code provides:
The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of the
law approved by the American Law Institute, and to the extent not
so expressed, as generally understood and applied in the United
States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin
Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws to
the contrary. 182
Pursuant to this statute, courts generally must defer to the Restatement
(Second). In the survey, one court applying Virgin Islands law felt

1983) (identifying section 153 as the “mainstream of judicial decisions”).
181
The comm ents to sections 1 5, 86 , 89, and 153 b riefly state the rationales
behind the rules in a single paragraph. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15
cmt. a (1981); id. § 86 cmt. b; id. § 89 cm t. a; id. § 153 cmt. a. T he co mments to
sections 87 and 139 explain the elements of the rules, but do not state their
rationa le. See id. § 87 cm ts. a-e; id. § 1 39 cmts. b-d .
182
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (1996).
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compelled by this statute to adopt the new rule on the modification of
contracts stated in section 89.183
In other jurisdictions, judicial decisions sometimes require courts to
defer to the ALI. For instance, the Arizona Supreme Court has decreed that
Arizona courts will follow the Restatements absent contrary authority. 184
Lower Arizona courts and federal courts sitting in diversity accordingly
must defer to rules in the Restatement (Second) when no statute or
precedent requires*530 otherwise.185 Five cases involved in the survey fall
within this category.186
Even if no decision expressly requires courts to defer to the Restatement
(Second), a widespread practice may create such a policy. For instance, in
Acme Investment, Inc. v. Southwest Tracor, Inc.,187 a federal district court
in a diversity case decided to follow section 238 (a provision not considered in the survey) because it observed that Nebraska courts often had
followed other provisions of the Restatement (Second).188 Courts have used
similar reasoning in other jurisdictions.189
4. Convenience
In a few of the cases involved in the survey, courts indicated that they
were accepting the new rules because of precedent, policy considerations,
or laws requiring them to follow the Restatements. In most of the cases,

183

See Billman v. V. I. Equities Corp., 743 F.2d 1021, 10 24 & n.3 (3d Cir.
1984) (following section 89).
184
See Bank of Am. v. J. & S. Auto Repairs, 694 P.2d 246, 248 (Ariz. 1985)
(“In the absence of contrary authority Arizona courts follow the Restatement of the
Law.”).
185
See, e.g., L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 880
F.2d 219, 223 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) (following Restatement (Second) based on
Arizo na preced ent req uiring co urts to defer to it).
186
See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 15 26 (D. Ariz. 1991 ) (citing
section 153 with approval), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1380, 1380 (9th Cir. 1992); AMERCO
v. Shoen, 907 P .2d 536, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Hill--Sha fer Partnership
v. Chilson Family Trust, 784 P.2d 691, 698 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989 ) (same), vacated,
799 P.2d 810 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Realty Assoc s. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 738 P.2d
1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing section 86 with approval); Hill v. Jones,
725 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing secTion 153 with approval).
187
911 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Neb. 1995), aff’d, 105 F.3d 4 12, 414 (8th Cir. 1997 ).
188
See id. at 1268.
189
See, e.g., Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205,
1209-10 n.6 (3d Cir. 199 3) (in b anc) (noting that Pe nnsylvania cour ts freque ntly
follow the Restatement).
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however, courts did not say anything about why they were adopting the
new rules. They simply cited the new rules and applied them much as they
would cite and apply a governing statute. Courts did not explain why they
were relying on the Restatement (Second), or critically analyze the rules
that they were applying.
Courts in these cases undoubtedly knew that the ALI has no authority
to make law and that courts may disagree with the Restatement (Second).
Most courts also probably knew that not all jurisdictions agree with every
rule in the Restatement (Second). So why did courts simply look up the
rules and apply them? My hypothesis is convenience. By deferring to the
Restatement (Second), courts avoided the difficulty of analyzing precedent
or weighing policy arguments.
Consider, for example, how the Massachusetts courts have received
section 153 on unilateral mistakes. In 1942, in Swinton v. Whitinsville
Savings Bank,190 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the
idea that a unilateral mistake could make a contract voidable.191 In that
case, a bank sold a house to a purchaser without disclosing that the house
had termite damage.192 The court refused to rescind the transaction despite
the purchaser’s*531 mistaken belief that the house contained no damage.193
The court explained that the bank had no duty to disclose, stating:
The law has not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing upon
the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this. That the
particular case here stated by the plaintiff possesses a certain appeal
to the moral sense is scarcely to be denied. . . . But the law cannot
provide special rules for termites and can hardly attempt to determine liability according to the varying probabilities of the existence
and discovery of different possible defects in the subjects of trade.
The rule of nonliability for bare nondisclosure has been stated and
followed by this court in [numerous cases cited].194
Section 153 rejects the result of Swinton. If a court applied section 153
to the facts of the Swinton case, the court would rescind the sale of the
house. The court would conclude that, under the circumstances, the
unilateral mistake of the purchaser would make the contract voidable.195 A
190

42 N.E .2d 808 (M ass. 1942).
See id . at 809 .
192
See id. at 808.
193
See id . at 809 .
194
Id. at 808-09.
195
See R estatem ent (Se cond) of Contracts § 153 (1981).
191
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Reporter’s Note in the Restatement (Second) confirms this analysis by
citing Swinton as contrary authority.196
In light of this background, litigants might have expected the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts to reject section 153 as contrary to its
precedent. In First Safety Fund National Bank v. Friel,197 however, the
court simply cited and applied section 153 without recognizing that it
conflicts with Swinton.198 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts has acted
similarly in two other cases.199 The courts in these three cases appear to
have deferred to the Restatement (Second) simply on grounds of convenience. Researching the black letter rules requires less effort than sifting
through fifty years of precedent.
Deference based on convenience has become so common that the
practice now attracts little attention. Courts apparently do not see a need
to explain the reason for what they are doing. As a consequence, the
Restatement (Second) now has extraordinary influence on the law.
IV. Propriety of Judicial Deference
The survey revealed that a large number of courts have followed the
new rules stated in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 of the
Restatement (Second). Most of these courts appear to have accepted the
new rules on grounds of convenience and not because either precedent or
careful considerations of policy mandated their acceptance. These
observations raise an important policy question: Should courts defer so
readily to a nonbinding *532 secondary source like the Restatement
(Second) in formulating common law rules?
The following discussion considers this question, addressing potential
legal and policy objections. It concludes that on balance the practice
appears not only lawful, but also more beneficial than harmful. Deference
to the Restatement (Second) generally adds clarity and uniformity to the
law and conserves judicial resources. A contrary conclusion would cast
doubt on both the competence of the hundreds of courts that have deferred
to the ALI’s rules and the concept of a restatement of contract law.
A. Possible Legal Objections

196

See id. § 161 reporter’s note cmt. d.
504 N.E .2d 6 64 (Mass. Ap p. Ct. 1 987 ).
198
See id. at 667.
199
See T orrao v. C ox, 525 N.E.2 d 1349, 13 52 (M ass. App. Ct. 1988); Covich
v. Chambers, 397 N .E.2d 1115 , 1121 (M ass. App. Ct. 1979).
197
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It is not easy to find a legal objection to the way that courts have
adopted the new rules in the Restatement (Second). Most states have given
courts the power to develop the rules of contract law in a common law
manner. Pursuant to this power, courts at one time developed the traditional rules that existed prior to the middle of this century. Also pursuant
to this power, it stands to reason, courts should be able to modify the rules
as they deem appropriate. In some cases, that power to modify may mean
adopting the new rules included in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139,
and 153 of the Restatement (Second).
Courts and commentators, nonetheless, have expressed two potential
objections to judicial deference to the ALI. First, although courts have the
power to develop new common law rules, they do not have the power to
contradict legislation. Second, even if courts have the power to make new
rules of contract law, they cannot delegate this power to the ALI. The
following discussion addresses these arguments but ultimately concludes
that neither has much force in the present context.
1. Supremacy of Legislation over the Common Law
Legislation generally takes precedence over common law rules,200
including the common law rules that govern contracts. For example, if the
state legislature passes a law that says eighteen year-olds have the capacity
to form nonvoidable contracts, a court could not retain a common law rule
setting the age of majority at twenty-one.201 On the contrary, the court
would have to follow the legislation. Any other result would place courts
ahead of state legislatures in the formation of the law.
In most states, the supremacy of legislation would not affect adoption
of the rules contained in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), or 153 of the
Restatement (Second). These sections address subjects usually left to the
common law. *533 Few states have statutes defining the test for mental

200
See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78
Geo. L.J. 281, 283-94 (1989) (discussing the topic of legislative suprema cy in
depth). The general principle that statutes take precedence over the common law
has exceptions. For example, prior com mon law decisions m ay con tinue to
influence the interpretation of statutes in a variety of ways. See Earl Maltz, The
Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 367, 386-87 (1988); Honorable Roger J.
Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 Cath. U. L. Rev. 401, 402
(1968).
201
See Restatement (Second) of Co ntracts § 14 cmt. a (noting that the common
law age of majo rity was 21, but that nearly all states have lowered the age to 18 by
legislation).
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incapacity, the validity of moral consideration, the consequences of reliance
on offers, or the rules regarding unilateral mistakes. Instead, states
generally have allowed courts to make rules in these areas, as they have
done for most of contracts law.
Section 89 differs somewhat. Almost all states have passed statutes
governing the modification of contracts. Section 2-209(1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code (the “U.C.C.”), in particular, provides: “An agreement
modifying a contract within this Article [i.e., Article 2 governing sales of
goods] needs no consideration to be binding.”202 A court could not adopt
a common law rule contradicting this provision. Two factors, however,
limit the extent to which section 2-209(1) of the U.C.C. conflicts with
section 89 of the Restatement (Second). First, section 2-209(1) applies only
to transactions in goods.203 Courts therefore still can adopt section 89 as a
common law governing other types of contracts. Second, sections 89 and
2-209(1) resemble each other very closely. Both sections weaken the
traditional preexisting duty rule, permitting courts to enforce modifications
even if no new consideration supports them. Section 2-209(1) merely
exceeds section 89 by not requiring (or at least not explicitly requiring) a
change of circumstances to justify the modification.204
Section 139 presents a greater challenge to the principle of legislative
supremacy. When courts adopt section 139, they arguably are contradicting
legislation. Section 139, as described above, creates an exception to a
statute--the statute of frauds. This section allows courts to enforce
unwritten promises that the statute indicates they should not enforce. For
this reason, several courts specifically have refused to adopt section 139.
For example, in Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co.,205 a litigant sought to
use section 139 to overcome the statute of frauds in section 2-201 of the
U.C.C.206 The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the argument,
concluding that enforcing an unwritten promise based on promissory
estoppel would contradict the statute.207 This position, although not

202

U.C.C. § 2-209 (1) (1995); see also id. § 2A-208(1) (implementing the same
rule for leases of goods).
203
See id . § 2-102 (defining the scope of the Article).
204
An official comment suggests that courts should not enforce modifications
made in bad faith. See id. § 2-209 cmt. 2. A person who requests a modification
when circumstances have not changed may be acting in bad faith. See id. In such
a case, section 89 and section 2 -209 might provid e the sam e result.
205
635 P.2d 10 3 (W ash. 19 81) (en banc).
206
See id. at 103.
207
See id . at 107 .
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universally accepted, has much to say for it. Courts certainly have no duty
to adopt the positions taken by the ALI and may decline to adopt them
when they think that they would run afoul of legislation.
Despite this reasoning, however, courts still might find adoption of
section 139--or other provisions touching upon subjects covered by a
statute-- permissible for two reasons. First, state legislatures may have
delegated to courts the power to balance competing interests in interpreting
statutes. The Supreme Court of Colorado, for instance, found that the state
legislature had *534 taken this approach in the U.C.C.208 Indeed, in many
cases, courts reasonably can assume that legislatures expect them to create
common law exceptions to the statute of frauds because courts have been
tinkering with statutes of frauds for many years.209
Second, the principles of legislative supremacy may vary from state to
state.210 Although the law in some jurisdictions may not permit judges to
create exceptions to statutes, it may allow the practice in others. Indeed,
some courts’ adoption of section 139 demonstrates this possibility. These
courts have the power to determine what is legal and what is not, and they
evidently have not seen a problem with creating an exception to the statute
of frauds.
2. Improper Delegation
Even if courts generally have the power to make common law rules,
they still face some limits on how they exercise that power. Judges, for
example, cannot allow bribes to influence their decisions. They also cannot
render decisions when they have a conflict of interest. A question thus
arises whether judges legitimately are exercising their lawmaking authority
if they simply defer to the Restatement (Second).

208

See Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764 , 770 (Colo. 198 3) (en banc). In
adopting section 139 , the court relied on section 1-103 of the U.C.C., which
provides: “Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to cap acity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.” U.C.C. § 1-103.
209
See F arnsworth, sup ra note 95, § 6.1, at 395 (explaining how the statute of
frauds “has been the subject of co nstant erosion” by the courts).
210
See Guido C alabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 101 (1982).
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Judge Paul A. Simmons forcefully has asserted that courts have gone too
far in their solicitude to the Restatements.211 He contends that “the courts
of this nation have surrendered to the ALI their inherent common law
judicial power to state, restate, and reformulate the legal principles that
must be used and applied by courts in the course of litigating various cases
and controversies in this nation’s judicial system.”212 Judge Simmons
maintains that this delegation of lawmaking authority from courts to the
ALI violates the separation of powers doctrine.213 In his view, courts must
exercise the power to develop the common law more independently.214
This argument, although forcefully made, fails for two reasons. First,
although courts may have followed the Restatement (Second) in many
cases, they actually have not delegated their authority to the ALI. No court
has committed itself to following whatever rules the Restatement (Second)
may contain. 215 Instead, courts consider the rules one at a time. Adopting
one *535 section does not bind them to follow another. The Pennsylvania
courts may adopt section 87(2),216 but still reject section 15(1)(b).217
Second, Judge Simmons’s argument, if taken to its logical extreme,
suggests that courts cannot follow any secondary sources when formulating
legal rules. Yet, judges traditionally have consulted a wide variety of
secondary sources when deciding cases. They often cite law review
articles, legal encyclopedias, treatises, dictionaries, and so forth. These
sources can further their understanding of existing law. They also enable
judges to see criticisms of the law that precedents alone might not supply.
For these reasons, a ban on consulting secondary sources has never existed
and would have deleterious consequences.
B. Policy
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See Paul A. Simmons, Government by an Una ccountable Private N on P rofit
Corporation, 1 0 N .Y.L. Sch. J. Hum . Rts. 67 , 71-7 2 (1992 ).
212
Id. at 89.
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See id . at 71.
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See id. at 89-90.
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The Arizona Supreme Court, as noted, has directed lower courts to follow the
rule in the Restatement (Second) absent contrary authority. See supra Part II.C.2.
The court, however, did not commit itself always to follow the rules. See supra Part
II.C.2 .
216
See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 593 (Pa.
1985) (H utchinson, J., concurring) (citing section 87).
217
S ee Estate of M cGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526-27 (Pa.
1986) (rejecting section 15(1)(b)).
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Even if deferring to the Restatement (Second) does not violate any law,
the question remains whether courts should engage in the practice as a
matter of policy. A simple utilitarian analysis suggests that the kind of
deference seen in the survey has both advantages and disadvantages. The
following discussion considers the potential costs and benefits of the
practice and concludes that the benefits generally outweigh the costs.
1. Potential Costs of Deference
When a court makes a new rule by simply deferring to the Restatement
(Second), it risks incurring two important costs. First, the court might
adopt a rule that does not achieve all of the goals that the court thinks
desirable. Second, to the extent that deferring to the Restatement (Second)
changes the law, the court risks upsetting settled expectations.
a. Adopting Inappropriate Rules
The substance of contract law makes a difference. Some rules may
promote economic efficiency better than others. Some rules may balance
the need for certainty with the need for flexibility better than others. Still
other rules may conform more closely to customary business practices. In
creating common law rules, courts generally are free to decide what goals
the rules should achieve. When a court defers to the Restatement (Second),
however, the rule it selects may not accomplish the ends that the court
considers important.
A court, for instance, may believe that the law should strive almost
exclusively to promote economic efficiency. The court also may believe
that efficiency requires enforcement of any contracts not induced by fraud,
incapacity, or duress.218 Accordingly, if the court were creating its own
rules, it *536 would not permit a party to void a contract based on unilateral
mistake. Yet, if the court simply defers to section 153, it would adopt a
contrary rule.219 Deference to the Restatement (Second), accordingly,
would come at a cost. A court would adopt a rule that it considers
inappropriate.
Several factors, however, mitigate this cost. First, the ALI has a fairly
mainstream orientation. Its members consist of lawyers, law professors,
and judges who mostly have the same vision of contract law as the judges
218

See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, § 4.7, at 104 (3d ed.
1986) (“Economic ana lysis reveals no grounds other than fraud, incapacity, and
duress...for allowing a party to repudiate the bargain that he made in entering into
the contract.”).
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See R estatem ent (Se cond) of Contracts § 153 (1981).
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who occupy courts of last resort throughout the states. Indeed, many of
these judges belong to the ALI and participate in the formulation of the
Restatements. 220 As a result, in most instances, the ALI designs its rules
to achieve nearly the same objectives that courts would want to achieve if
they were drafting the rules from scratch.221
Second, the ALI’s rules may accomplish courts’ goals even better than
any rules that courts might devise themselves. The ALI publishes its
Restatements only after years of diligent work by academics and lawyers
widely acknowledged as experts in their fields. It requires every comment
in every section to contain illustrations and thus insures that any rules
stated actually will produce clear results. Courts simply do not have the
time or resources to devote a comparable effort to creating or revising
rules.222
Third, any errors that courts make by deferring to the Restatement
(Second) probably will have only minor consequences. Some contractual
rules may be better than others, but the difference often does not matter
much. Unlike tort liability, which often governs the rights of involuntary
participants, contractual liability generally is voluntary. Parties usually can
choose whether to enter into contracts, and if so, on what terms they wish
the contract to proceed. Accordingly, parties usually can work around
contracts rules that do not fit their needs. In many cases, therefore,
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See su pra note 54 and acco mpa nying text.
See Simmons, supra note 211, at 86-88. Judge Simmons objects to deference
to the AL I partly b ecause he b elieves that the ALI has biases that will prevent it
from choosing a ppro priate rules. He no tes that most of its members have affiliations
with elite Ivy League law schools, and thus may not see issues in the same light as
the general public. See id. at 86-87. He also notes that “[t]here are no sociologists,
econo mists, accountants, political scientists, bankers, stockbrokers, insurance
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on the AL I Council.” Id . at 88 (citation o mitted). Judge Sim mon s, however, fails to
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court justices. These justices might choose the same rules as those in the Restatement (Seco nd) even if the A LI did not exist.
222
But see James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some
Difficulties, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 140, 156 (1981) (arguing that “[i]t would be better
to allow courts to settle on rules as they feel it necessary in the interests of
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at once involves greater difficulty than creating an ind ividual rule in a single case.
See id. The ALI, however, has put in the effort to create a comprehensive set of
rules to govern c ontracts.
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adopting inappropriate contracts rules will impose only minor burdens on
the parties or society.223
*537 Consider, for example, the new rule in section 89 that, in some
instances, makes promises to modify contracts binding even in the absence
of additional consideration.224 Suppose that a court defers to this rule
because it appears in the Restatement (Second). This rule need not affect
parties who do not like it. A party who does not want to make a binding
promise to modify a contract has a simple option. He or she simply can
refuse to make such a promise. The rule, accordingly, applies only to the
small number of people who make promises without receiving consideration and then later decide not to keep them.
Fourth, even if courts generally defer to the Restatement (Second), they
remain free to disregard any provisions with which they disagree. The
Pennsylvania courts, as noted, have cited sections 87(2) and 153
favorably,225 but they have refused to adopt section 15(1)(b).226 Even
jurisdictions like Arizona and the Virgin Islands, which by case law and
statute follow the Restatement (Second) in the absence of contrary law,
have the freedom to reject its provisions when necessary. Thus, although
deference may cause courts to pick some inappropriate rules, this cost
seems likely to remain rather small.
b. Unsettling Expectations
Courts risk imposing another cost when they defer to new rules in the
Restatement (Second). To the extent that they change existing doctrines
significantly, courts may upset settled expectations. For example, relying
on the traditional doctrine that courts will not disturb bargains based solely
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This stateme nt requ ires som e qua lification. A lthough parties may contract
around rules that they do not like in most instances, they may incur additional
transaction costs. In addition, the choice of the default rule may have distributional
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pay to get aro und it. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and
Policy, 199 2 W is. L. Re v. 1, 9-10 (1992); see also Katz, supra note 122, at 1265
(questioning whether parties actually will have the knowledge and skill to contract
around legal rules such as section 8 7(2)).
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See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89.
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See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581, 593 (Pa.
1985) (citing section 87); Lanci v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 564 A.2d 972, 974-75
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on unilateral mistakes, a party may withhold facts from another party
during negotiations. If a court later adopts the new rule on unilateral
mistakes in section 153 of the Restatement (Second) and rescinds the
contract, its action will surprise the party that did not make the disclosure.
Although unsettling expectations does impose a cost on the parties (and
perhaps society as a whole), several factors may lessen the blow. First,
many parties to whom the new rules apply do not have a clear understanding of the law anyway. As a result, they do not have expectations that a
court can upset. For example, few business people know exactly which
kinds of contracts fall within the statute of frauds and which do not.
Accordingly, in many instances, in applying section 139 to enforce an
unwritten promise, a court will not upset their expectations. Second, in
many instances, parties’ expectations may accord more closely with the
new rules than traditional contract doctrine. The new rule in section 89
provides a good example. Nonlawyers well *538 might expect that contract
modifications will bind them even absent new consideration. In such
instances, a court would upset expectations less by adopting the new rule
in section 89 than by applying the traditional preexisting duty doctrine.
2. Benefits
Deference to the Restatement (Second) in theory may impose some
limited costs. Yet, at the same time, it also has a number of benefits. A
policy or practice of following the Restatement (Second) rules may
promote clarity and uniformity in the law, and conserve judicial resources.
Although courts have not mentioned these benefits in their opinions, they
may have influenced their decisions to defer to the new rules considered in
the survey.
a. Clarity
The ALI, as described above, undertook the project of producing the
Restatements specifically to address the difficulty that courts were having
in discerning common law rules from large numbers of precedents.227 They
sought to create an authoritative source that plainly and concretely would
express rules of contracts and other common law subjects. Few would
contest that the Restatement (Second) has achieved this goal. It has
stunningly well-drafted rules accompanied by careful explanations and
illustrations. When courts adopt these rules, they almost inevitably bring
clarity to contract doctrines.
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Improving clarity in the law benefits society because uncertainty about
the governing legal rule imposes a number of social costs. Uncertainty
increases the amount of time that individuals must devote to legal research
and litigation.228 It also causes people to misgauge legal boundaries.229
Without clear contract rules, parties may think contracts are binding when
they are not, or vice versa. Merely stating the rules in a clear manner can
alleviate these problems.
True, sometimes the law favors vagueness. Legal doctrines often rely
on standards such as reasonableness or injustice rather than black-andwhite tests. The Restatement (Second) includes many such standards;
indeed, all of the six sections considered in the survey employ one or more
of them. 230 Naturally, a court sometimes will disagree about how the
standards apply to the facts of a particular case. Yet, even when a section
of the Restatement (Second) contains a standard, courts still can promote
legal clarity by adopting the section. Although parties and judges may not
know exactly how the standard applies, they at least will know which
standard governs. In this way, *539 even if the new rules considered in the
survey will not eliminate uncertainty, they will reduce the costs associated
with it.
b. Uniformity
The United States has more than fifty jurisdictions that have the power
to create common law rules of contracts. Because courts in each jurisdiction act independently when exercising this authority, they often have
produced different rules. As a result, the law of contracts in many
instances lacks uniformity from one jurisdiction to another. The rules in
one state, put simply, may differ from those in another.
Nonuniformity in contract law may cause problems. As one commentator famously put it, commerce relies heavily on contracts, but “knows
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Legis. 123, 126-30 (199 2) (discussing the costs of ambiguity in legal rules).
229
See id . at 127 -28.
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See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)(b) (1981) ( “reasonable”); id.
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nothing of [[[s]tate boundaries.”231 A party in one jurisdiction frequently
will make a contract with a party in another jurisdiction. If the contract law
differs between the two jurisdictions, the parties may have difficulty
determining which rule will govern their conduct, and the result may
surprise one party or the other.
The desire for uniformity in the law of contracts led to the enactment in
nearly every jurisdiction of the Uniform Sales Act in the first half of this
century and its successor, Article 2 of the U.C.C., in the second half. 232
Article 2, however, has a limited scope; it applies only to “transactions in
goods” and not to contracts involving services or other subject matters.233
As a result, much of the law of contracts remains nonuniform throughout
the different states.
Deference to the Restatement (Second) tends to make the law more
uniform. When a court follows a Restatement (Second) provision, it
usually is adopting a rule that other jurisdictions already have followed and
more will accept in the future. For example, if a court follows the rule laid
out in section 153, its rules on unilateral mistakes will match those in effect
in at least twenty-two other jurisdictions.
Uniformity, despite its benefits, does have a disadvantage. Sometimes
standardization can become the enemy of progress because it discourages
innovation. If courts value having the same rule as other jurisdictions more
than having the best rule possible, they will not experiment in an effort to
improve the law of contracts. For example, if the California Supreme Court
had not adopted a new rule in Drennan v. Star Paving Co. section 87(2)
might not have come to exist. To the extent that these rules reflect better
policies than their predecessors, society might have suffered.
This concern does not appear especially grave. No courts have bound
themselves to follow the Restatement (Second). Courts defer when they
have no particular objections to the Restatement (Second)’s rules. If a court
ever *540 did think another rule preferable, it could refuse to follow the
ALI’s recommendation. Eight of the cases considered in the survey, after
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See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1,
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all, took exactly that course of action. Thus, even though widespread
deference to the Restatement (Second) generally will promote uniformity,
it certainly does not make experimentation impossible.
c. Conservation of Judicial Resources
Many observers have remarked in recent years that both state and
federal courts, especially at the appellate level, have too much work. 234
Time saving measures that do not adversely affect the quality of a judge’s
work may free up judicial resources for other tasks. For example, if courts
spend less time on contracts cases, they may have more time for criminal
cases and so forth. The Restatement (Second) may help in this regard.
By deferring to the Restatement (Second) when determining the
applicable law, courts have saved time and effort in deciding contracts
cases. Indeed, this benefit probably explains better than anything else why
most courts in the survey actually cited and applied the new rules in
sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153. Courts in most cases
appeared to want a quick answer to the question before them. Because the
Restatement (Second) supplied a convenient statement of the rule of
contract law, most of the opinions required only a paragraph to decide the
issues that they confronted. In the aggregate, with more than twenty-four
thousand cases citing the Restatement (Second)’s formulation of the
rules,235 this benefit gradually adds up to a considerable savings of judicial
resources.
Simplifying the task of judicial decisionmaking does have limits.
Judges could rule easily if they merely had to flip a coin to determine
whether the plaintiff or the defendant should win. Deference to the
Restatement (Second), however, not only lessens the burden on courts, but
in most instances also improves the quality of the contracts doctrine.
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See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Fed eral Courts: Crisis and Reform chs. 3-5
(1985) (explaining the extent and consequences of the case load expansion and
suggesting “institutional proposals” to deal with the problem); Thomas E . Baker,
A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: “Neither out Far Nor in Deep,” 45
Case W . Res. L. Rev. 705, 71 5-18 , 741 (1995) (discussing the p rominent role state
courts, in com pariso n to federal co urts, will play in preparing for the influx in cases
and appeals filed); Edith H. Jones, B ack to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts:
Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 T ex. L. Rev.
1485, 1487-91 (1995) (describing the problem of an increased case load at the
appellate level).
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The improvement takes two forms. First, from a technical standpoint,
the Restatement (Second) contains carefully worded and superbly drafted
rules. For the most part, the rules also fit together in a coherent manner. 236
For instance, the sections on offer and acceptance mesh with those
addressing mistake, misrepresentation, and so forth. As long as a court
agrees with the outcome of the rule, the court generally will do better to
adopt it than to try to rephrase it. The ALI, after all, studied the rules for
years before finally *541 promulgating them. Courts should not seek to
duplicate this effort when they simply can follow the pertinent sections.
Second, from a substantive standpoint, the rules generally promote
mainstream goals in contracts law. Although judges may disagree with
some of the rules on substantive grounds, they should keep in mind the
limitations of their judgment. A large number of legal experts have devoted
decades to formulating the rules in the Restatement (Second). As a result,
they probably have chosen better substantive rules than anyone could
expect to devise without expending comparable effort to weighing
competing policy objectives.
C. Deference in Perspective
The foregoing discussion strongly supports judicial deference to the
Restatement (Second). It argues that deference generally violates no legal
principles, and that it has limited social costs and substantial benefits. This
conclusion may strike some readers as controversial because it does not fit
closely with the traditional model of common law development. Courts are
not slowly developing and refining the rules of contracts law in an
incremental manner. Instead, they simply are choosing a rule from a book
and then applying it. Two observations, however, may help to put my
conclusion in perspective.
First, the practice of deferring to the Restatement (Second) has become
extraordinarily widespread. Several hundred courts have deferred to the six
new rules considered in the survey alone. Thousands of decisions have
cited and followed other rules. Any assertion that courts should not or
legally cannot defer, as so many already have done, would imply that
almost all of the judiciary, acting independently or in concert, are doing
something fundamentally wrong.
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Second, any objection to courts’ actions would cast in doubt the basic
plan of the Restatement (Second). The ALI created this work not as an
academic exercise, but instead because they wanted to devise clear rules
that courts could understand and follow. The ALI did not expect courts to
trouble themselves very much with policy considerations in adopting the
rules. Instead, the ALI wanted deference, and they achieved it.
These two observations, needless to say, do not demonstrate that courts
have acted properly. The foregoing discussion attempts to do that. Instead,
these observations merely serve to show that what at first might seem
surprising, if not shocking, in fact should be less controversial than the
alternative. The status quo in the common law development of contracts
doctrine--deference to the ALI--although different from the historical
model, should not seem so peculiar.237
*542 A. Concluding Prediction
The survey found that the vast majority of courts that have cited the new
rules in sections 15, 86, 87, 89, 139, and 153 have followed them.238 Out
of 241 cases, only eight decisions cited the new rules in a negative manner.
Besides showing that courts generally defer to the Restatement (Second),
what does this observation suggest about the status of these particular
sections?
The survey does not prove that courts in every jurisdiction or even a
majority of jurisdictions have adopted the new rules. Most states simply
have not yet had the opportunity to consider the six sections surveyed. For
example, although over eighty cases have cited section 153 on the subject
of unilateral mistake, there were only forty-six state cases from only
twenty-four different states (including the District of Columbia).239 Even
fewer jurisdictions have produced decisions citing the other five sections.240
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W hether courts should exercise comparable deference to other ALI
publications, such as the Restatement (Second) of To rts, remains an open question
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The methodology of the survey also may have exaggerated to some
extent the popularity of the new rules. Many of the decisions citing the
rules mentioned them only in dicta. In addition, courts that have disagreed
with the sections may have decided not to cite them. For example, courts
that do not believe that past consideration can suffice as a basis for
enforcement simply may state that rule without bothering to say anything
about section 86.
Despite these limitations, the observation that 233 out of 241 cases cited
the new rules favorably leads me to predict that most courts will adopt
these rules if presented with issues to which they apply. Making predictions of this sort, of course, involves some hazards. Professor Grant
Gilmore, for example, famously predicted that promissory estoppel would
swallow up the consideration doctrine,241 and that forecast has not proved
accurate.242 Yet, the results of the survey make continued acceptance of
sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 seem quite likely.
When these six sections first appeared in the Restatement (Second), they
all stated new rules that had little support in the cases and that contradicted
traditional statements of contracts doctrine. The survey shows that large
numbers of courts nonetheless have been adopting the rules.243 Nothing has
happened that might bring that trend to an end; courts, on the whole, have
not established substantial precedent for rejecting the rules. On the
contrary, a large body of cases--233 and counting--now supports these six
rules. These precedents create additional momentum, making the movement
toward adopting the sections all the more difficult to stop.
I undertook the survey to help answer the question whether the new
rules stated in sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153 accurately
state the law. The survey shows that most of the rules already have gained
a strong foothold in the precedent. The number of favorable decisions
almost *543 certainly will grow as time proceeds. To the extent that a
statement of the law represents a prediction about what rule a court will
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follow when confronted with a set of facts,244 then the rules appear to
express the law of contracts with admirable accuracy.
Appendix
This Appendix lists the cases citing sections 15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89,
139, and 153. Citations to federal decisions follow the citations to state
decisions (including those from the District of Columbia).
Section 15(1)(b)
Alaska
Pappert v. Sargent, 847 P.2d 66, 70 (Alaska 1993).
District of Columbia
Butler v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098, 1100-01 (D.C. 1990).
Massachusetts
Krasner v. Berk, 319 N.E.2d 897, 898, 900 (Mass. 1974).
Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 204-05 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
New York
Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 465 (N.Y. 1969).
In re Estate of Obermeier, 540 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Weiss, J.,
dissenting).
Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Group, 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
Tomasino v. New York State Employees’ Retirement Sys., 448 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (N.Y.
App. Div.) (Weiss, J., dissenting), aff’d, 440 N.E.2d 1330 (N.Y. 1982).
Pentinen v. New York State Employees’ Retirement Sys., 401 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978).
Keith v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement Sys., 362 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1974).
In re Estate of ACN, 509 N.Y.S.2d 966, 970 (Sur. Ct. 1986).
In re Estate of Gebauer, 361 N.Y.S.2d 539, 544-45 (Sur. Ct. 1974).
Oregon
Gore v. Gadd, 522 P.2d 212, 213 n.1 (Or. 1974) (in banc).
*544 Pennsylvania
Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 517 A.2d 523, 526, 530 (Pa. 1986).
Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 981, 984-86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
Tennessee
In re Ellis, 822 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
Texas
Smith v. Christley, 755 S.W.2d 525, 532-33 (Tex. App. 1988).
Nohra v. Evans, 509 S.W.2d 648, 654-55 (Tex. App. 1974).
Wisconsin
Hauer v. Union State Bank, 532 N.W.2d 456, 461 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
Federal
FDIC v. Ohlson, 659 F. Supp. 490, 492 n.3 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
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In re Hall, 188 B.R. 476, 485 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
In re Britton, 66 B.R. 572, 577 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).

Section 86
Arizona
Realty Assocs. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 738 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
California
Knight v. Board of Admin. of Pub. Employees’ Retirement Sys., 273 Cal. Rptr. 120, 145
n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
Missouri
McMurry v. Magnusson, 849 S.W.2d 619, 623 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
Federal
First Nat’l Bankshares, Inc. v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344, 1357 (D. Kan. 1994).
Section 87(2)
Colorado
Centric-Jones Co. v. Hufnagel, 848 P.2d 942, 956 n.4 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (Vollack,
J., dissenting in part).
*545 Idaho
Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 582 P.2d 1074, 1081 n.2 (Idaho 1978) (Bistline, J., concurring).
Iowa
Levien Leasing Co. v. Dickey Co., 380 N.W.2d 748, 754 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
Maryland
Pavel Enters., Inc. v. A. S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521, 529 & n.17 (Md. 1996).
Massachusetts
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (Mass. 1995).
Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserman Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Mass. 1978).
Cannavino & Shea, Inc. v. Water Works Supply Corp., 280 N.E.2d 147, 149 (Mass.
1972).
Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306, 311 n.3 (Mass. App.
Ct.), aff’d, 384 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1978).
Missouri
Cleveland v. High Country Fashions, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
New Mexico
Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. 1996).
New York
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